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A NEW NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY
by
James J. Tritten
President George Bush unveiled a new national security
strategy for the United States in his August 2, 1990 speech at
the Aspen Institute. The concepts outlined in the President's
Aspen speech were developed by official spokesmen in the follow-
ing four months. The national security strategy concepts he
unveiled would be revolutionary and have direct and dramatic
impacts on NATO and the rest of the world.
Essentially, the President opened the door to a total reex-
amination of America's role in the world and its overall military
capability. Rather than deploy forces at the levels maintained
since World War II, the United States would maintain a much
smaller active and reserve force mix capable of dealing with
world-wide major contingency operations -- not a Europe-centered
global war with the USSR. If forces were required to fight a
major war against the Soviet Union, the U.S. assumes that there
would be sufficient time to reconstitute them -- specifically,
two year's warning for a Europe-centered global war with the
USSR.
The estimated two-year warning is predicated upon the as-
sumptions that all Soviet ground and air forces will withdraw to
the homeland, that a CFE-like parity will exist from the Atlantic
to the Urals, that the USSR will remain inwardly focused, and
that NATO and its member states intelligence apparatus are func-
tioning.
The major factor underlying the reexamination of America's
role in the world, and basic national security strategy, is the
recognition by the Congress and the Administration that the level
of resources devoted to defense in the last decade cannot be sus-
tained. Assuming a two years warning of a Europe-centered war
with the USSR, the Bush Administration assumes that it can gener-
ate wholly new forces - to rebuild or "reconstitute" them if
necessary. Specifically, current forces deemed unnecessary, will
be disbanded, not put into the reserves.
The New York Times covered the new strategy on August 2
,
1990. According to the initial report in the New York Times , the
force structure numbers that were discussed were:
• Army : 12 active, 2 reconstitutable reserve, 6 other re-
serve divisions (currently 18 active & 10 reserve)
• Air Force : 25 active & reserve tactical air wings (cur-
rently 36)
• Navy : 11-12 aircraft carriers (currently 14)
• Marine Corps : 150,000 personnel (currently 196,000)
Late December 1990 reports in the media have used slightly
higher numbers, reflective of budgetary negotiations. Force
levels discussed in those reports included some differences: a
Navy of around 450 ships (down from 538) including 11-12 aircraft
carriers and a Marine Corps of 160,000 personnel.
Originally termed the "base force," a new force structure
advocated by Chairman of the JCS, General Colin Powell, will be
organized into four basic military components: Strategic nuclear
offensive and defensive; Atlantic; Pacific; and a Contingency
Response Force; and four supporting capabilities: Transportation,
Space, Reconstitution, and R&D.
The Strategic Force would include those offensive forces
that survive the START-II process, where numbers like 4500 and
3000 warheads have been discussed openly during the past year.
Reducing the offensive threat dramatically to such lower numbers
suggests revisiting the suitability of strategic defenses. It
is likely that strategic defenses will continue as an R&D pro-
gram. General Powell stated in December that the U.S. remains
committed to a triad of offensive forces, but that we would
probably increase reliance on sea-based systems.
The Atlantic and Pacific Forces appear to be headed for both
reductions and restructuring. The Atlantic force will include
residual forces remaining in Europe, those forward-deployed to
Europe, and the continental U.S. -based reinforcing force. This
force would be responsible for Europe, the Middle East, and
Southwest Asia. General Powell stated in December that the
residual Atlantic Force retained in Europe would consist of a
heavy Army component (Corps strength) with supporting air forces.
The New York Times report discussed 100,000 - 125,000 military
personnel remaining in Europe as part of the Chairman's revised
force structure, although a 50,000 - 100,000 level was openly
discussed at the September conference of the International Insti-
tute for Strategic Studies.
U.S. forces in Europe cannot be changed without considering
commitments made to allies and the planned employment of American
resources in combined operations under NATO command. The July
1990 NATO London Declaration stated that the Alliance too was
preparing a new "military strategy moving away from 'forward
defense 1 ..."
Army General John R. Galvin, NATO's SACEUR, recently told
the Defense Planning Committee that he envisages a change in his
primary combat mission from flexible response and forward defense
to crisis response. The centerpiece of this capability would be
a standing Rapid Reaction Corps centered about a multinational
corps and the existing ACE Mobile Forces. Should these standing
forces not be able to support political decision making, then
additional forces will be mobilized and regenerated or "reconsti-
tuted."
Air Force General George Lee Butler, the former J-5, stated
in a September address at the National Press Club ". . .that the
U.S. could undertake a prudent, phased series of steps to reduce
modestly our force presence in Korea, as well as Japan and else-
where." The Pacific Force will include those residual forces
remaining in Korea and Japan, those forward-deployed in the
theater, and reinforcing forces located in the continental U.S.
General Powell stated in December that "the bulk of American Army
and Air Force power in the Pacific would be as
reinforcements . . . using Hawaii, Alaska, and the continental
United States as springboards." It is not clear if forces as-
signed to the Pacific will have a dual commitment to the European
theater in a revitalized "swing strategy" but it should be noted
that Japan-based U.S. forces have participated in Operations
DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM.
Perhaps the most dramatic innovation of the Chairman's
recommended force structure is the creation of a Contingency
Force based in the continental United States. The Contingency
Force will apparently be shaped by the need to provide an over-
seas presence and response to regional contingencies with heavy
armored forces if needed - not to return quickly to Europe.
Today's crises are extremely dangerous due to the prolifera-
tion of advanced weaponry and weapons of mass destruction and the
demonstrated willingness of Third World nations to use them.
Conflict in the Third World is increasingly destructive and
lethal. General Butler described planning for regional contin-
gencies as planning for "graduated deterrence response." U.S.
crisis response forces will provide presence with the ability to
reinforce with sufficient forces to prevent a potentially major
crisis from escalating or to resolve favorably less demanding
conflicts.
General Butler provided the most detailed breakdown of the
Contingency Force. The first stage of a Contingency Force
would consist of: (1) Army light & airborne divisions, (2) Marine
Corps Expeditionary Brigades, (3) Special Operations Forces, and
(4) selected Air Force units. Ground units would fly to a crisis
area, much as they did to Saudi Arabia. This initial component
of the Contingency Force would be buttressed as necessary by:
(1) carrier forces, and (2) amphibious forces. The third tier of
the Contingency Force appears to be heavier forces with the
capability for long-term sustainability.
The current Middle East crisis demonstrates that the U.S.
can muster sufficient assets to meet a major contingency where
there were no forces in being. Indeed, General Powell drew a
parallel in a December speech between Operation DESERT SHIELD and
the President's new strategy. Operation DESERT SHIELD also seems
to demonstrate that such a force does not require basing over-
seas, such as in Europe.
Once DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM after action reports are
written, analysts will try to answer the question what systems
appeared to make a difference in the political and military
outcome. Systems that did not make a major contribution to this
contingency operation will need to be reevaluated for upgrading
or cancellation and replacement. Under the new strategy to
reconstitute capabilities useful in a Europe-centered war with
the USSR, there will be no need to retain systems that do not
have a dual use in the Contingency Force.
The issues raised in the President's Aspen speech are numer-
ous, complex, and require discussion. Some of the more important
include: how likely is the new strategy to take hold; how do we
define our new goals and objectives for both program and war
planning; what is the lasting impact of our current contingency
operations in the Middle East; what are the new requirements for
the intelligence community, for decision-making, investment
strategy, personnel and organizations, for technology, and the
transition period?
There appears to be four main problem areas in which solu-
tions portend success for the President's dream. The first is
that everything depends upon the responsible and good behavior of
the Soviet Union. It may not be desirable to have your fundamen-
tal national security strategy so dependent upon the behavior of
the once "evil empire" but, for the new strategy to work, the
Soviets must return to their homeland, remain inwardly focused,
and continue the serious reductions in military capability they
have started. Additional drawdowns in naval and strategic nucle-
ar systems must follow soon.
The second critical area demands that the intelligence
community must be able to surmount the new challenges. If fund-
ing for intelligence follows defense downward, then the reconsti-
tution portion of the new strategy is bankrupt. The intelligence
community should move into spheres they have traditionally under-
emphasized, such as the Third World and economics. They will also
have significantly increased burdens demanded by the monitoring
and verification of compliance of arms control agreements. All
of this is possible if decision-makers recognize this crucial
underpinning of the new strategy.
The third area that can undermine a successful transition to
this new world will be the international behavior of allies and
the U.S. Congress. Clearly, none of this is going to happen
without Congress onboard. Defense Secretary Dick Cheney's ef-
forts to have his department articulate the new strategy are
designed to ensure that the DoD is ahead of Congress and that the
new policies are adopted.
The final critical success factor is the ability of private
industry to deliver. What is envisaged is not the same as indus-
trial mobilization. We need to both save our defense industrial
base under very new conditions, and simultaneously reduce defense
spending. How can we do this when the Administration is not
willing to address the need for a national industrial policy?
Major changes in the way we do business are required to
retain both our technological position in the world and the
personnel necessary to meet newly defined defense needs. By
withdrawing forces from overseas and promising to reconstitute
forces within two years and return, the United States will have
fundamentally changed its international political-military pos-
ture.
A major implication of the two-year big war warning is that
American programming strategy will shift its focus to the threats
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presented in other areas of the world. Until now, the unstated
relationship of the threat to programmed forces was, generally,
that U.S. forces would meet the challenge of the most demanding
threat, the USSR, and assume that they could also cope with
lesser contingencies. That basic assumption was generally not
entirely true and now will be essentially reversed: forces will
be acquired to meet the challenges of the more likely, less
demanding, threats assuming that they are useful against the more
unlikely but greater threat posed by a Soviet Union that decides
to rearm.
The operations analysis and political science communities
will need to cooperate like they never have before. The need for
analysis of the old, massive, short-term (14-day) mobilization
has diminished. The military operations analysis community needs
to reorient itself to measurements of reconstitution where the
timelines are measures in months and years and not days or weeks.
New planning scenarios need to be created and wargames need
to be conducted to help us study the lessons of wars and cam-
paigns yet to be fought. An artificial history can be written of
alternative futures so that the military can better advise their
political leadership on the most suitable courses of action for
decisions they should make today. Gaming, naturally, is no
substitute for solid analysis. Gaming, however, can provide new
insight and supplements more traditional methods of dealing with
alternative futures. Perhaps the time has come to even jointly-
game with the USSR the deescalation of crises.
Strategic warning, decision making, non-NATO battlefields
(ashore and at sea) , manpower and personnel planning, resource
allocation, test and evaluation, combat models, and gaming and
simulation are all areas that will need fundamental readjustment
due to the new international security environment. MORS has
Working Groups in all of these areas and we hope to address all
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